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THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN PRELIMINARY HEARINGS IN
VIRGINIA
CHARLES E. FRIEND*
Although the rules of evidence in criminal trials in Virginia have
received extensive and detailed attention in the Virginia Code,' in
the decisions and rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, 2 and in
Virginia treatises and law review articles,' little or no legislative,
judicial, or scholarly attention has been given to the question of the
rules of evidence applicable in preliminary hearings. Confronted
with a lack of direction from either the legislature or the Supreme
Court of Virginia regarding the conduct of preliminary hearings,
many Virginia judges and lawyers have in the past quite naturally
assumed that the complex rules applicable at the trial stage do not
apply at preliminary hearings, or that at least these rules are relaxed
considerably in such proceedings.
In recent years, however, there has been increasing concern as to
the propriety of the use at preliminary hearings of evidence that
would not be admissible at trial. The importance of the issue has
been underscored by two decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States which have dealt squarely with the constitutional
status of the preliminary hearing and its incidents. In these cases,
Gerstein v. Pugh' and Coleman v. Alabama,5 the Supreme Court
has drawn a constitutional distinction between hearings in which a
determination is made as to whether there is probable cause for the
* B.A., George Washington University; B.F.T., American Graduate School of International
Management; J.D., Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary; Professor,
Campbell University School of Law.
The author would like to thank Martha G. Rollins of the William and Mary Law Review
Staff for her help in conducting the survey described in this article.
1. The portions of the Virginia Code which deal specifically with evidentiary matters are
concerned almost exclusively with the trial stage. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-385 to -420.1,
19.2-267 to -282 (1950 & Supp. 1978).
2. The numerous Virginia appellate decisions on points of evidence likewise refer, almost
without exception, to rulings made at the trial itself. The applicable rules of court are found
in Part 3A of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
3. Treatises include M. MARSHALL, J. FrrrZHUGH, JR. & J. HELVIN, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE IN
VIRGNIA AND WEST VIRGINIA (1954); and C. FRmEND, THE LAw OF EVmENCE IN VmonIA (1977).
As to law review articles, see, for example, the periodic surveys of Virginia evidence law in
the University of Virginia Law Review.
4. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
5. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
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detention of the accused, and hearings in which the issue is whether
or not the accused should be prosecuted (either by proceeding to
trial upon information or by seeking a grand jury indictment).
According to the Gerstein decision, the first type of hearing, al-
though constitutionally mandated at least in the case of a warrant-
less arrest, is not an adversary proceeding, and the magistrate's or
judge's determination may be based on hearsay evidence.' Under
the holding in Coleman, as further explained in Gerstein, a prelimi-
nary hearing to determine whether the evidence justifies going to
trial upon information or presenting the case to the grand jury is not
a constitutional requirement; but when a state chooses to establish
such a procedure, it is a "critical stage" of the criminal process-an
adversary proceeding in which all of the familiar constitutional safe-
guards are applicable, including the right to counsel and the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses.7
Although Coleman and Gerstein do not expressly cover the point,
the decisions, when read together, seem to some observers to imply
that in a proceeding to determine whether there is probable cause
to prosecute, the "adversary safeguards"' demanded by the
Coleman case may include the requirement that the rules of evi-
dence applicable to criminal trials must be observed in the prelimi-
nary proceeding. Because the preliminary hearing required by the
Virginia Code9 appears to be of the "probable-cause-to-prosecute"
type, it now becomes particularly important for us to examine the
status of the rules of evidence as they are currently applied in pre-
liminary hearings in Virginia.
The Current Practice in Preliminary Hearings in Virginia
There is no express requirement under Virginia law at present
that the rules of evidence be observed in preliminary hearings. By
the same token, there is no express authorization for the relaxation
of the rules in such proceedings. The applicable statutes, found in
chapter 12 of title 19.2 of the Code of Virginia,10 provide no direct
6. 420 U.S. at 120.
7. 399 U.S. at 9-10. See also C. WHITEBREAD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 259-60
(1978) ("Thus, the full panoply of adversary safeguards-counsel, confrontation, cross-
examination, and compulsory process for witnesses-should be provided when the hearing
involves a determination whether to prosecute.").
8. 399 U.S. at 7.
9. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-183 to -190 (1950 & Supp. 1978).
10. Id.
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guidance. The judge at a preliminary hearing is required by statute
to advise the accused of his right to counsel, to appoint counsel if
the accused is indigent, and to hear witnesses for and against the
accused." The statute also states that the accused is entitled to
cross-examine witnesses and to take the stand in his own behalf.
2
These provisions appear to comply with the mandate of Coleman v.
Alabama. '3 There is, however, no reference in the statute to the rules
of evidence, if any, applicable to the proceedings.
The Rules of Court follow a similar pattern: rule 3A-5(b)'4 pro-
vides for the right to counsel and the right to call and cross-examine
witnesses, but no reference is made to the rules of evidence per se.
The Supreme Court of Virginia does not appear to have dealt
expressly with the issue in its decisions either. Although there are
many reported cases dealing with various aspects of the preliminary
hearing, none of the opinions address the evidentiary question di-
rectly.'"
The only express references to evidentiary matters in preliminary
hearings of the probable-cause-to-prosecute type appear in sections
19.2-187 and 19.2-18816 of the Code of Virginia, which permit the
admission into evidence of certificates of laboratory analysis and
reports of medical examiners, respectively. No reference to other
rules of evidence is found in these sections, however, and any sup-
port in these sections for the proposition that the rules must other-
wise be applied in preliminary hearings is purely inferential.'
7
In view of the lack of authority in Virginia on the question, an
attempt was made to determine whether, in actual practice, the
rules of evidence are or are not currently being applied in prelimi-
nary hearings in Virginia's district courts. To this end, question-
naires were mailed or delivered to 102 district court judges in var-
ious sections of the Commonwealth. Sixty-three responses were re-
11. Id. § 19.2-183.
12. Id.
13. See note 5 & accompanying text supra.
14. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:5(b).
15. It has been suggested to the author that a few Virginia opinions support or deny the
applicability of the evidentiary rules by implication or inference. The cases so far cited to
the author appear at best to be related only very distantly to the point at issue, but some of
these decisions are, nevertheless, discussed below. See note 20 & accompanying text infra.
16. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-187 to -188 (1950 & Supp. 1978).
17. It is arguable that these sections, which provide in effect for the admission of certain
types of written hearsay, thereby imply that the hearsay rule is otherwise applicable. This
contention is discussed further below. See text accompanying note 29 infra.
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ceived. Fifty-five of these respondents stated that they apply all of
the standard rules of evidence in preliminary hearings, while six
indicated that they admit hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings
but otherwise adhere generally to the standard rules of evidence.'8
However, conversations with a number of judges, as well as the
language of some of the survey responses, suggests that many of the
judges who do apply all of the rules of evidence in preliminary
hearings do so because they feel they are obligated by law to do so,
and not out of personal preference.
It therefore appears that, while the rules of evidence are in fact
now being applied in preliminary hearings in a majority of Virginia's
lower courts, there is at least some variation in practice among the
districts in the state. Furthermore, it appears that this variation in
approach is accompanied by sharp differences in opinion among the
district court judges as to which approach is the more desirable and
proper.",
In view of this disparity of viewpoint in the courts, it may be
helpful to examine some of the arguments that are advanced both
for and against the application of the rules in preliminary hearings.
Arguments Against Application of the Rules of Evidence in Prelimi-
nary Hearings
As noted above, neither the legislature nor the Supreme Court of
Virginia has imposed any express requirement that the rules be
observed in preliminary hearings. This silence is construed by some
to indicate that the rules are not applicable, or at least that the
matter is within the discretion of the judge. Some Virginia deci-
sions, it has been argued, contain language which at least implies
that application of the rules is not required, but those cases cited
to the author either dealt solely with related but separate issues,
such as the extent to which a preliminary hearing may be used as a
discovery device,"0 or simply did not refer to preliminary hearings
at all.
18. Two judges declined to respond to the questions because their courts heard only civil
matters. The author is deeply grateful to the judges who took the time to respond to these
inquiries and extends his thanks and the thanks of the William and Mary Law Review to the
respondents for their courtesy and interest.
19. Many of the responding judges made comments in support of their respective proce-
dures. Some of these arguments are discussed below.
20. E.g., Foster v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 326, 163 S.E.2d 601 (1968); Williams v. Com-
monwealth, 208 Va. 724, 160 S.E.2d 781 (1968).
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Emphasis frequently has been placed upon the fact that the pre-
liminary hearing is not a trial to determine guilt or innocence, but
rather is a proceeding to determine probable cause only, thereby
rendering inappropriate and unnecessary the observation in it of the
strict evidential standards imposed at trial. One survey respondent
observed:
Hearsay evidence is usually sufficient for probable cause to issue
a warrant and is usually sufficient before [a] grand jury for a
true bill. Therefore there is no reason for it not to be admissible
to estab[lish] probable cause at [a preliminary hearing]."
This argument regarding the inapplicability of the hearsay rule in
grand jury proceedings has often been made in support of the in-
applicability of the rules of evidence at preliminary hearings. The
use in grand jury proceedings of evidence which would not be admis-
sible at trial has been approved by the Supreme Court of the United
States2 and, by inference at least, by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia. 23 This lends some weight to the argument that no stricter
standard should be required at the preliminary hearing, which oc-
curs prior to the grand jury deliberations. 2'
It also has been argued that to enforce the strict rules of evidence
at preliminary hearings would greatly prolong such hearings, turn-
ing them into lengthy, full-fledged trials. In view of the power of the
Commonwealth's attorney to seek an indictment even if no probable
cause is found at the preliminary hearings, 21 this additional expend-
iture of time and effort is certainly questionable. Furthermore, it
21. The identity of the judge has been withheld in accordance with the terms of the survey.
22. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
23. Wadley v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 803, 35 S.E. 452 (1900). See also Whyte, Is the Grand
Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. RaV. 461, 488 (1959); Note, The Grand Jury in Virginia, 22 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 325, 336 (1965).
24. In support of the decision to make hearsay admissible at preliminary hearings con-
ducted under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Advisory Committee on Rules
stated:
A grand jury indictment may properly be based on hearsay evidence. . . .This
being so, there is practical advantage in making the evidentiary requirements
for the preliminary examination as flexible as they are for the grand jury. Other-
wise there will be increased pressure upon United States Attorneys to abandon
the preliminary examination in favor of the grand jury indictment.
FED. R. CRiM. P. 5.1, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules. Although the Virginia proce-
dure, of course, is not the same as the Federal procedure, the point made by the Committee
has some relevance to the present inquiry.
25. Moore v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 388, 237 S.E.2d 187 (1977).
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has been suggested that the transformation of the preliminary hear-
ing into a full-scale trial may enable counsel to use the preliminary
hearing as a discovery device-a tactic which the Supreme Court of
Virginia has specifically disapproved."
Arguments in Favor of Application of the Rules of Evidence in Pre-
liminary Hearings
Numerous arguments are advanced for enforcing the rules of evi-
dence in preliminary hearings. The district judges responding to the
survey argued variously (and vigorously) that an accurate determi-
nation of probable cause requires full application of the rules of
evidence; that there is no justification for admitting, at the district
court level, evidence which will not be admissible in the circuit
court; and that the preliminary hearing has, due to counsel's fear
of inadequate representation writs, already evolved into a formal
trial anyway.
Several of the responding judges pointed out that because the
Virginia preliminary hearing clearly is intended to be an adversary
proceeding, with the rights of counsel, cross-examination, etc., at-
tached, it is only logical that the rules of evidence should apply as
well. Because the preliminary hearing may result in a misdemeanor
trial in the same district court,2 at least one district judge felt that
the application of the rules of evidence at the preliminary hearing
is a necessity if the accused is to be assured of a fair trial on the
misdemeanor charge.2
The most concrete argument in favor of the applicability of the
rules centers around the implications to be drawn from the language
of sections 19.2-187 and 19.2-188 of the Code of Virginia. As noted
26. Foster v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 326, 163 S.E.2d 601 (1968); Williams v. Common-
wealth, 208 Va. 724, 160 S.E.2d 781 (1968).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-186 (1950).
28. This argument may have been weakened somewhat by the holding in Moore v. Com-
monwealth, 218 Va. 388, 237 S.E.2d 187 (197.7). In discussing the question of whether jeopardy
attached at the preliminary hearing because of the power of the district court to try the
accused on a lesser included offense under VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-186, the court in Moore noted
that the district courts are not required by statute to try an accused immediately on such a
lesser offense. 218 Va. at 391-92, 237 S.E.2d at 190-91. Thus, where a district court finds no
probable cause on the felony charge but elects to try the accused for a misdemeanor, the
misdemeanor trial may be held at a later date (and, presumably, before a different judge), if
it appears that any evidence has been received in the preliminary hearing which would be
inadmissible at a trial and that such evidence would prejudice the defendant if an immediate
trial were held.
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earlier in this discussion, these statutes provide for the admissibility
in preliminary hearings of certificates of laboratory analysis and
certificates of medical examiners. It is certainly arguable that by
creating these statutory exceptions to the rules of evidence, the
legislature was recognizing by implication that the rules of evidence
are otherwise applicable. The 1975 edition of Defending Criminal
Cases in Virginia states:
Although there appears to be no Virginia statute or case prescrib-
ing the evidentiary rules for a preliminary hearing, the logical
view is that the hearing should be governed by the same rules of
evidence applicable at the trial. Evidently, it is the opinion of the
General Assembly that the rules of the trial obtain, since by
special statute it recently made admissible at the preliminary
hearing certain certificates of analysis otherwise violative of the
hearsay rule.2"
Irrespective of the foregoing arguments, the issue may be resolved
for Virginia and for all other jurisdictions by the constitutional in-
terpretations of the Supreme Court of the United States. As dis-
cussed at the beginning of this article, in the cases of Coleman v.
Alabama"0 and Gerstein v. Pugh3l the Court has stated flatly that
preliminary hearings of the probable-cause-to-prosecute type are
subject to the constitutional safeguards of right to counsel and right
to cross-examine witnesses, among others. Although no specific
mention of the rules of evidence was made in these opinions, it
seems arguable that the requirement that adversary safeguards, in-
cluding the right to cross-examine, be observed may in turn necessi-
tate the application of the full array of evidentiary rules in prelimi-
nary hearings of the probable-cause-to-prosecute type. If this is in
fact the view held by the Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States, it certainly is not unrealistic to expect that Court to
render, sooner or later, a decision to that effect. 3 To date, however,
29. DEFENDING CRMINAL CASES IN VIRGINIA 142 (P. Manson ed. 1975) (published by the
Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the Virginia State Bar and the Virginia
Bar Association).
30. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
31. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
32. This result is by no means certain. Application of the entire system of common law
evidentiary rules is not necessarily mandated by due process requirements. For example, it
has been held that the statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule created by the legislature,
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-187 to -188, do not violate the right of confrontation. Robertson v. Cox,
320 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Va. 1970).
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no such decision has been forthcoming, leaving us to speculate as
to what the Supreme Court's position will be.
The Practice in Other Jurisdictions
In the absence of any definitive decision, statute, or rule in Vir-
ginia, a brief look at the situation in neighboring jurisdictions may
be of interest.
The most common statutory reference to the applicability of the
rules of evidence to preliminary hearings involves the hearsay rule.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit the use of hearsay
in probable-cause-to-prosecute type preliminary hearings. Rule 5.1
states, "The finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay
evidence in whole or in part."33 The Federal Rules of Evidence ex-
pressly exclude preliminary hearings from their coverage." North
Carolina, on the other hand, specifically prohibits a finding of prob-
able cause based upon hearsay evidence in the type of hearing under
discussion here. The North Carolina statute provides that:
The State must by nonhearsay evidence, or by evidence that
satisfies an exception to the hearsay rule, show that there is prob-
able cause .... 3
Among Virginia's immediate neighbors, only West Virginia seems
to have a legislative enactment that squarely confronts the issue of
the use of the other evidentiary rules at preliminary hearings. The
West Virginia Code states:
Witnesses shall be examined and evidence introduced for the
State under the rules of evidence prevailing in criminal trials
generally."
These examples illustrate that the diversity of viewpoint found
within Virginia is duplicated elsewhere. It would be difficult to say
what the majority rule is nationally, but McCormick's hornbook on
evidence states that:
The general rule seems to be that the exclusionary rule does not
apply to preliminary hearings.37
33. FED. R. CrM. P. 5.1(a).
34. FED. R. Evm. 1101.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-611(b) (Rep. Vol. 1978).
36. W. VA. CODE § 62-1-8 (Rep. Vol. 1977).
3.7. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 167, at 369 n.36 (2d ed. 1972).
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Conclusion
In summary, it may be said that (1) there is presently no man-
date, statutory or otherwise, which either requires or prohibits the
use of the standard rules of evidence in preliminary hearings in
Virginia; (2) the actual practice in the state district courts varies
from district to district, with a large majority applying the rules of
evidence in whole or part; and (3) the matter eventually may be
settled by the Supreme Court of the United States if it is not first
resolved by action of the Supreme Court of Virginia or the Virginia
General Assembly.
In the absence of any such mandate, however, it appears to the
author that the arguments against full application of the rules of
evidence in preliminary hearings have the greater weight. This con-
clusion is based primarily upon the following considerations:
1. The limited objective of the proceeding. The preliminary
hearing in Virginia is intended only as a screening device. There is
no determination of guilt or innocence; the sole purpose of the hear-
ing is to determine whether the matter should be presented to the
grand jury for further consideration. A full-scale trial for this limited
purpose seems unnecessary, and indeed may not serve the best in-
terests of either the Commonwealth or the accused. At best, such
an approach must necessarily cause delay and contribute to the
congestion of court dockets-a problem that is already of great con-
cern to the judiciary, the bar, and the public.
2. The ability of the Commonwealth's attorney to seek an in-
dictment regardless of the outcome of the preliminary hearing. Even
if the preliminary hearing results in a finding of "no probable
cause," the Commonwealth's attorney still may present the case to
the grand jury." Thus the preliminary hearing is not only restricted
to the narrow question of probable cause, but is not even finally
determinative of the limited issue. It seems wasteful to impose all
of the cumbersome evidentiary requirements upon a preliminary
determination of a preliminary issue.
3. The inapplicability of the rules of evidence in grand jury
proceedings. As noted, the preliminary hearing was designed as a
screening device to determine what matters would be presented to
the grand jury, which is the ultimate arbiter of probable cause in
Virginia. Because the rules of evidence are not applicable in grand
38. See note 25 & accompanying text supra.
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jury proceedings, it seems incongruous to require the district courts
to apply all of those rules in a proceeding that occurs prior to the
grand jury hearing, and that can be nullified or overridden by the
action of the grand jury. 9
In light of these factors, it appears to the author that to require
application of the full panoply of evidence rules in a preliminary
hearing is to impose them in a situation for which they were not
designed and in which their application is unnecessary. By the same
token, however, it appears to the author that practical considera-
tions necessitate the retention of at least some restrictions upon the
material which may be presented at the preliminary hearing. While
the rules of evidence are, of course, designed in part to ensure a fair
trial for the accused, they also serve to protect the court from being
inundated by irrelevant, repetitive, or otherwise useless informa-
tion. The retention of some portion of the rules is surely necessary
to enable the judge to retain control of the proceedings and to reach
a prompt decision.
It therefore seems probable that the best solution to the problem
is to suspend, selectively, those evidentiary rules which are not nec-
essary in light of the nature of the preliminary hearing and its place
in our legal system, while retaining those rules which are essential
to ensure the accused due process and to prevent unlimited admis-
sion of irrelevant or otherwise useless evidence. The decision of some
of our judges (and some of our neighboring jurisdictions) to admit
hearsay in preliminary hearings while otherwise applying the rules
of evidence in those proceedings is clearly an attempt to accomplish
just such a result. This position appears to the author preferable,
on balance, to either full application or complete abrogation of the
rules in these preliminary proceedings.
This conclusion implies no criticism whatsoever of the courts
which have elected to apply all of the rules of evidence in prelimi-
nary hearings in their courts. The arguments favoring such applica-
tion have undoubted force and may quite reasonably be regarded by
many as persuasive. In addition, as noted earlier, it appears that
some of the district courts that have elected to apply all of the rules
in preliminary hearings may have done so simply because they feel
39. The author expresses no opinion as to the effectiveness of the grand jury, the propriety
of its present position in Virginia's criminal justice system, or the appropriateness of the rules
under which it presently performs its functions. Changes in the grand jury system itself, of
course, would affect any conclusions reached herein regarding the preliminary hearing.
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that they are required to do so, or perhaps solely because of caution
generated by the complete lack of authoritative guidance on the
point; in these instances, the application of the rules may be con-
trary to the individual judge's personal feelings in the matter."
In any event, and whatever the reasons involved, the fact that the
vast majority of district judges responding to the survey question-
naire indicated that they are presently applying all of the rules of
evidence must be given considerable weight; a consensus of Vir-
ginia's active trial judges cannot and should not be ignored and may
indeed prove decisive upon the point if the legislature or the Su-
preme Court of Virginia chooses to address the matter directly. And,
finally, it should be noted that recent nationwide trends in criminal
justice generally would seem to favor full application of the rules;
regardless of the weight of the arguments against such application.
In the absence of a binding decision by the Supreme Court, or
federal legislation mandating full application, it would seem that it
might be appropriate for Virginia's judiciary and/or legislature to
conduct a formal study of the problem to determine just which rules
should or should not be applied in preliminary hearings. It may be
that certain rules (including, but not necessarily limited to, the
hearsay rule) can indeed be relaxed at the preliminary stages of
criminal proceedings without undue prejudice to any participant,
but the matter requires careful consideration before any state-wide
solution is attempted.
Regardless of the ultimate conclusion reached, however, action by
the Supreme Court or the General Assembly would ensure one ad-
vantage-consistency among the various districts, which most
would agree is in itself a desirable end. But until the question is
resolved by the Court or legislative action, the issue will remain one
upon which reasonable judges and lawyers may (and will) continue
honestly and honorably to differ.
40. Note also that this discussion, and the author's conclusions, refer only to the applica-
tion of evidentiary rules in preliminary hearings; the use of evidentiary rules in trials in the
district courts is an entirely different matter.
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